Huh?

NY Times - It was particularly ironic that Mr. Chertoff spun this theory while he was fighting off a measure, up for a vote today, that would help protect our ports against the threat that he himself deems most worrisome — a nuclear explosion within our borders — without government spending.

Baltimore Sun - Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, testifying before a Senate panel earlier yesterday, urged lawmakers to approve the port security legislation, calling it "a tremendous contribution" to measures the Bush administration has already undertaken.

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Here is Secretary Chertoff responding in April to questions about the Bush administration's supposed failure to secure our ports which according to Nancy Pelosi means no less than checking every container that comes to the US. I don't know - Chertoff's response seems reasonable to me. Especially considering that I don't know that anyone's ever been accused of trying to smuggle WMDs to our shores in containers.

Secretary Chertoff: All right, let me start with the first question. Let's see where we were prior to 2001 and where we are now.

Prior to 2001, we didn't have any radiation portal monitors in our U.S. ports. By the end of this year, two-thirds of the containers coming into this country will go through radiation portal monitors, and by the end of next year, virtually every container will go through radiation portal monitors.

Before 2001, we didn't have a network of x-ray machines or gamma machines that we could use to look inside or x-ray inside containers when we had a reason to do so. Now we have a network like that.

Before 2001, we didn't have a Container Security Initiative that systematically puts our Customs inspectors overseas so we could actually do screening and inspection before containers were loaded. Now we have a network of those inspectors overseas in 44 seaports. By the end of this year, 80 percent of the container cargo loaded on ships bound for the U.S. will be coming through seaports that are part of that initiative.

So a tremendous amount has been accomplished. And, again, as I say, including the budget in 2007, we've spent approximately $9 billion on maritime security. That's money in Coast Guard, that's money in Customs and Border Protection, that's money in grants.

So I don't think it's possible with a straight face, frankly, to make the argument that we haven't done a tremendous amount since 9/11 to raise the level of security in our ports. I'm not saying we're at the end of the road here, but we have made a considerable amount of progress going down that road.

Now, first of all, we do 100 percent screening of everything that comes through the country through our shipping lanes. Based on information we receive, we screen all those containers to determine the high-risk containers, and then we inspect those containers that are high-risk. And as I said, by the end of next year, we will be actually moving all of those containers, or virtually all of them, through radiation portal monitors.

What we don't do, which sometimes people say we should do, is physically inspect every container. And the reason is because if we were to do that, we would make it virtually impossible to move goods into this country because of the time consumed.

And I guess I would say to anybody who says, we want 100 percent inspection of every container that comes in, I think if they come from a port city, they ought to ask the longshoremen in the port, well, what do you think if we have 100 percent physical opening of every container that comes in? I suspect the longshoremen are going to say, well, you know, we'd like to keep our jobs, which means we'd like to keep the port open, so please don't do that.

The fact of the matter is the way to do this, is to do it smart, and the way to do it smart is to use technology, the kind we're using now and the kind I looked over at in Hong Kong a couple weeks ago. It's to use our intelligence to identify the high-risk containers and make sure we do inspect those. But to call for physical inspection of every container is like saying we ought to strip search everybody who gets on an airplane. I mean, in theory, that would make us very safe, but I think it would destroy the airline industry.

So we're not going to strip search people, everybody getting on an airplane, and I don't think it's wise to physically inspect every container. I do think it's wise to use the kind of technology I saw in Hong Kong, and the kind of technology we are using in ports in this country screening 100 percent, check 100 percent for radiation, and make sure we are looking at any container which is a high-risk.